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People often find it hard to disagree with others, but how this disposition varies across
individuals or how it is influenced by social factors like other people’s level of expertise
remains little understood. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we found
that activity across a network of brain areas [comprising posterior medial frontal cortex
(pMFC), anterior insula (AI), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), lateral orbitofrontal cortex, and
angular gyrus] was modulated by individual differences in the frequency with which
participants actively disagreed with statements made by others. Specifically, participants
who disagreed less frequently exhibited greater brain activation in these areas when
they actually disagreed. Given the role of this network in cognitive dissonance, our
results suggest that some participants had more trouble disagreeing due to a heightened
cognitive dissonance response. Contrary to expectation, the level of expertise (high or
low) had no effect on behavior or brain activity.
Keywords: conflict, individual differences, expertise, cognitive dissonance, social neuroscience, posterior medial
frontal cortex, anterior insula
INTRODUCTION
The freedom to make autonomous choices (within the limits of the law) without fear of harm
or prosecution is a fundamental value at the core of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
democratic societies andmarket economies. However, individual choice is never fully autonomous.
We may be highly susceptible to the opinions of others (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Levine
and Tindale, 2015), which means that our choices are vulnerable to the effects of social influence
(Berns et al., 2005). Social influence is not by itself a problem, but it can be deleterious if it
occurs unreflectively, as when individuals agree with others for the sake of agreeing. This is
potentially a bigger issue than it may first appear given research showing that, without evidence
to the contrary, people have a general disposition to believe and agree with others. The deception
detection literature, for example, has consistently shown that a percentage of statements judged as
truthful is significantly higher than the percentage of statements correctly classified as truthful (see
meta-analyses by Vrij, 2000; Bond and DePaulo, 2006). The truth bias, as this phenomenon has
been termed, is a necessary social default that facilitates how we interact and deal with other people
(Vrij, 2000).
The truth bias, however, represents a challenge for societies to balance. It entails a reduced
inclination for individuals to disagree with their peers, with potentially adverse effects on
autonomous choice. There is evidence that this reduced inclination to disagree may vary across
individuals (Laird and Berglas, 1975; Cialdini et al., 1995; Matz et al., 2008; Campbell-Meiklejohn
et al., 2010; Meshi et al., 2012), and that it can be exacerbated by social factors like peer pressure
(Berns et al., 2005), and the perceived authority or expertise of others. Expertise, for example, has
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been found not only to be a powerful source of persuasion
(Klucharev et al., 2008) but also to lead to greater agreement
(Crano, 1970; Meshi et al., 2012). The impact an inability to
critically disagree with others has on everyday situations may
be more clearly appreciated when considered in the light of
the fallibility of expert advice or imperfect (or even fraudulent)
expert pronouncements. For example, advise from financial
experts prior to the Global Financial Crisis generated a climate
where poor investment decisions weremade and sub-prime loans
were sought and approved.
Neuroscientists have recently started to investigate the neural
mechanisms underlying disagreement. Studies in this area have
implicated a set of posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC)
structures [comprising dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), and pre-supplementary motor
area] as well as anterior insula (AI; Westen et al., 2006; Klucharev
et al., 2009; Berns et al., 2010; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010;
Shestakova et al., 2013). These areas have previously been found
to play a key role in cognitive dissonance (van Veen et al., 2009;
Izuma et al., 2010, 2015; Izuma, 2013; Kitayama et al., 2013),
a heightened state of mental stress and discomfort experienced
by people when their beliefs, ideas or values come into direct
contradiction with each other (Festinger, 1957). Consequently,
cognitive dissonance is thought to be an important component
of the brain’s response to disagreement (Berns et al., 2010; Izuma
et al., 2015), a view further supported by findings showing that
disagreement elicits cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Matz
andWood, 2005; Matz et al., 2008; Berns et al., 2010). In addition,
individual differences in pMFC and AI activity predict attitude
change in response to disagreement and counter-attitudinal
argumentation, which is suggestive that the resulting cognitive
dissonance is more pronounced in some individuals than others
(van Veen et al., 2009; Berns et al., 2010). These studies therefore
suggest that cognitive dissonance is an important psychological
mechanism behind the difficulty some people have to disagree
with others and, consequently, the truth bias.
In this fMRI study, we aimed to further explore why
people often find it hard to disagree with others, and how
this effect is modulated by individual differences and other
people’s expertise. We were specifically interested in exploring
whether cognitive dissonance is a factor in people’s disposition
to agree/disagree and, consequently, their truth bias. Previous
studies have investigated the brain responses to others’ subjective
opinions that are the same or different from participants’
opinions (Klucharev et al., 2009; Berns et al., 2010; Campbell-
Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Meshi et al., 2012; Izuma and Adolphs,
2013). As our aim was to assess participants’ disposition to
disagree rather than their reaction to disagreement, we asked
them to make an active decision to agree or disagree with others.
We also wanted to ensure participants’ responses reflected
their disposition to disagree and the effect of expertise on it,
unconfounded by other variables like knowledge of the subject
area, personal opinions, valuations or preferences. Therefore,
unlike previous studies, the chosen object of disagreement was
not subjective opinions but objectively defined statements that
could be correct or incorrect. Moreover, the statements were
designed to be difficult with the purpose of inducing participants
to rely more on the person making the statement and their level
of expertise (high vs. low), rather than their own knowledge.
We predicted that, due to the existence of the truth bias,
participants would more often agree with the statements than
disagree. We expected this would be motivated, at least in part,
by the experience of cognitive dissonance during disagreement.
Accordingly, we anticipated increased activation in response
to disagreement in pMFC and AI. Importantly, individual
differences were expected to modulate the above effects as
suggested by earlier studies (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010;
Meshi et al., 2012). In line with this, we hypothesized individuals
would vary in the extent to which they found it hard to disagree,
with some participants being able to disagree with ease (more
often) and others only with difficulty (less often). Consequently,
we also expected that individuals who disagree less often would
show the highest activation in pMFC and AI when they do
disagree, consistent with a heightened cognitive dissonance
response. In addition, we hypothesized the truth bias would be
enhanced by expertise, with participants agreeing more often
with people with high vs. low perceived levels of expertise.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Thirty-nine healthy right-handed participants (19 females; mean
age = 22.1 years, SD = 5.0 years) took part in this study
in exchange for payment. Written informed consent was
obtained from each participant in accordance with the Helsinki
Declaration. The study was approved by the Behavioral and
Social Science Ethical Review Committee of The University of
Queensland.
Experimental Stimuli and Task
Participants were presented with a total 192 true or false
statements from four fields of knowledge: biology (e.g., “Orchid
flowers have the most species”), history (e.g., “The first public
library was opened in England”), medicine (e.g., “Protanopia is
the inability to see the color green”), and physics (e.g., “The faster
you move the heavier you get”). For the full list of statements
see Supplementary Table 1. In total, each topic contained 24
true and 24 false statements (see Supplementary Figure 1 for
distribution of true and false statements across topics). During
the experiment, the statements were attributed to an individual
with high or low expertise in the subject area: a professor
or a student, respectively. There were therefore four types of
statements: true statements by a professor (TP), false statements
by a professor (FP), true statements by a student (TS), and false
statements by a student (FS).
Participants were asked to decide whether the statements were
true or false. Agreement was therefore operationalized as true
judgments and disagreement as false judgments. Participants
were told statements were checked for their accuracy, with
many of them found to be incorrect. This was done to ensure
participants disagreed (i.e., judged statements as false) often
enough. Owing to the existence of the truth bias, it was otherwise
expected participants would have a high inclination to agree with
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a majority of statements. The statements were therefore designed
to be difficult.
The difficulty of the statements was confirmed in a prior
validation behavioral experiment with an independent cohort
of 20 participants (18 females; mean age = 21.6 years, SD =
7.0 years). Written informed consent was obtained from each
participant in accordance with the Helsinki Declaration. The
study was approved by the Behavioral and Social Science Ethical
Review Committee of TheUniversity of Queensland. Participants
were instructed to read each statement carefully and rate how
likely they thought each statement is true on a seven-point scale
(1 = I’m sure it is true, 4 = I have no idea if it is true or false,
7= I’m sure it is false). An independent t-test revealed that there
was no significant difference in truthfulness rating between the
true statements (M = 4.09, SD= 0.54) and false statements (M =
4.20, SD = 0.50), t(190) = −1.41, p = 0.160. Participants were
therefore, on average, unable to differentiate between true and
false statements in the set. Additional independent t-tests showed
that there was no difference between the number of words for
the true (M = 8.01, SD = 2.07) and false statements (M = 7.60,
SD = 1.97), t(190) = 1.43, p = 0.155, or between the number of
characters for true (M = 36.94, SD = 9.47) and false statements
(M = 37.08, SD= 9.41), t(190) = −0.11, p = 0.915.
One half of the true (T1) and one half of the false (F1)
statements were randomly assigned to the professors and the
other halves of true (T2) and false (F2) statements were assigned
to the students. Which subsets (T1, T2, F1, F2) were assigned to
professors or students was counterbalanced across participants.
A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences between
the mean truthfulness ratings of any these subsets of statements,
F(3, 188) = 0.347, p = 0.791: T1 (M = 4.21, SD= 0.41), T2 (M =
4.11, SD = 0.55), F1 (M = 4.15, SD = 0.57), and F2 (M = 4.11,
SD = 0.57). There were also no significant differences between
the number of words per statement and the number of characters
per statement across subsets, F(3, 188) = 0.63, p = 0.595: T1 (M=
37.40, SD = 10.44), T2 (M = 36.67, SD = 9.52), F1 (M = 38.50,
SD= 10.93), and F2 (M = 35.90, SD= 7.35).
fMRI Paradigm
Each of four functional runs contained 12 randomly presented
blocks, including eight task blocks (lasting 65 s each) and four
rest blocks (lasting 20 s each). Task blocks grouped statements
by expertise level: four blocks contained statements attributed to
a professor (i.e., high expertise level statements) that could be
true or false (TP, FP), and the remaining four blocks contained
statements attributed to a student (i.e., low expertise level
statements) that could be true or false (TS, FS). During rest blocks
(i.e., baseline condition) a fixation cross was presented at the
center of the screen. A fixation cross was also presented for 5 s
at the beginning of each run (allowing the magnet to reduce
to a steady-state) and for 10 s at the end of each run. A task
block started with a 5 s presentation that indicated whether the
subsequent six statements were being made either by a professor
or a student (i.e., “The following 6 statements are made by
a professor in that field”). The statements were presented for
9 s each, followed by a 1 s fixation cross after each statement
(see Figure 1). Statements were randomly selected (without
replacement) from a list of true and false statements assigned to
each level of expertise (see previous section). Each statement type
was presented 12 times per run (e.g., 12 TP statements, presented
across the four high expertise blocks). In total, each statement
type was presented 48 times across the experiment. Participants
were given 9 s to read and respond with True or False to each
statement using the two-button response pad given. Participants
were instructed to use both thumbs when using the response pad.
To avoid any confounding effects on neural activation associated
withmotor responses, the correspondence between button (1:left,
2:right) and response (true/false) was randomly switched around
across statements.
fMRI Data Acquisition
Structural and functionalMR images were acquired with a 3 Tesla
scanner (Siemens AG, Erlangen, Germany) and a 32-channel
head coil. Functional images were acquired using gradient-echo
planar imaging (EPI) with the following parameters: repetition
time (TR) = 2.5 s; echo time (TE) = 36ms; flip angle = 90◦;
64 × 64 matrix; voxel size = 3 × 3 × 3mm. A total of 246
whole brain images per run were acquired, each consisting of
36 transversal slices with 10% gap between each slice. A high-
resolution 3D T1-weighted image covering the entire brain was
also acquired after the second run for anatomical reference (TR=
1900 s; TE = 2.32ms; flip angle = 9◦; 192 × 192 matrix; voxel
size= 0.9× 0.9× 0.9mm).
Data Analysis
Behavioral Data Analysis
In this study, there were two factors—agreement and expertise—
with two levels each—agree/disagree (corresponding to true/false
judgments), and high/low, respectively. This resulted in four
conditions: agreement with a professor (AP), disagreement with a
professor (FP), agreement with a student (AS), and disagreement
with a student (FS). An agreement score was then computed by
subtracting disagree (false) from agree (true) scores, collapsed
across the levels of expertise (i.e., [DP + DS] − [AP + AS]).
A score of 0 indicates that participants disagreed as often as
they agreed; a score of -192 means they always agreed; and a
score of 192 means they always disagreed. An expertise score
was also calculated by determining the difference in scores
between professor and student, collapsed across the levels of
agreement (i.e., [DP − AP] − [DS − AS]). A score of 0
means that participants trusted the professor as much as the
student. Negative scores indicate they believed more in the
professor, while positive scores mean they believed more in
the student. One sample t-tests were then used to evaluate
whether the agreement and expertise scores were significantly
different from 0. We also conducted a regression analysis of the
effect of expertise, agreement and their interaction on response
time (RT).
fMRI Data Analysis
Functional MRI data were pre-processed and analyzed
with SPM8 Software (Wellcome Department of Imaging
Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London) through
MATLAB (MathWorks Inc., USA). All EPI images were first
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FIGURE 1 | Stimuli and experimental paradigm. Each 65 s task block began with a red text indicating the expertise of the person making the statement (5 s). This
was followed by six statements (9 s each), each separated by fixation crosses (1 s). Onsets of a sample of events within a block are shown. Responses were made by
pressing either button 1 (left) or 2 (right) to indicate True (agreement) or False (disagreement) during the statement presentation. The correspondence between button
(1:left, 2:right) and response (true/false) was randomly switched around across statements (as illustrated).
realigned to the first image of each run to offset any effects
of head movements. The T1-weighted anatomical scan for
each participant was then coregistered to the mean functional
image created during realignment. Using the segment routine,
the coregistered anatomical scan was then normalized with a
voxel size of 1 × 1 × 1mm to the MNI T1 standard template
(Montreal Neuropsychological Institute). Following this, the
same parameters were used to normalize all of the EPI images
to map onto the template using a voxel size of 3 × 3 × 3mm.
The images were then smoothed with a 9-mm isotropic Gaussian
kernel.
A general linear model was used to estimate regions of
significant Blood Oxygen Level Dependent (BOLD) response
in each voxel for each participant and included event-related
regressors for each of four conditions (AP, DP, AS, and DS);
that is, each condition was modeled based on the participant’s
agree/disagree (true/false) responses to the statements. The onset
of each event corresponded to the start of the slides in which
the statements were shown and had a duration of 9 s. Contrast
images for each participant across all conditions were included
at the second level in a 2 (agreement: Agree vs. Disagree) ×
2 (expertise: Professor vs. Student) factorial design, and the
main effects and interaction effects were estimated. The above
experimental design can therefore be effectively conceived as
mixed, since statements were blocked by level of expertise, but
could only be sorted by agreement post-hoc. Thus, the block
aspect of the study aimed to increase the design efficiency with
respect to expertise. Being response-dependent, the agreement
factor had a random distribution of event types (agree vs.
disagree), which ensured that the design had an adequate level
of efficiency with respect to this factor (Dale, 1999; Friston et al.,
1999).
To investigate if participants who disagreed less often had
more activation in the pMFC and AI when they disagreed, we
modeled the relationship between the BOLD response exclusive
to the disagreement compared to agreement condition (i.e., the
Disagree minus Agree contrast), with the agreement score (i.e.,
[DP + DS] − [AP + AS]). Specifically, we expected a negative
correlation between the two. That is, the less people disagree (i.e.,
the lower the agreement score), the more activation we expected
in pMFC and AI when people disagree (i.e., the Disagree minus
Agree contrast). A cluster-level threshold with family-wise error
rate (FWE) of p < 0.05 corrected for the whole brain was used
to identify significant results for all analyses, with clusters defined
by a voxel level threshold of p < 0.001.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
The agreement score was not significantly different from 0 (M =
0.64, SD= 53.84), t(38) = 0.07, p = 0.941. Similarly, the expertise
score was not significantly different from 0 (M = −2.13, SD =
19.58), t(38) = −0.68, p = 0.493 (The expertise score was not
normally distributed so a bootstrapped intercept-only regression
model with 5000 iterations was used). No significant effect of
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agreement (z = 0.13, p = 0.89), expertise (z = 0.20, p = 0.84) or
their interaction (z = −0.12, p = 0.91) was found on RT (results
from a bootstrapped regression with 5000 iterations are reported
as normality assumptions were not met; AP RT M = 4286ms,
SD = 781ms; DP RT M = 4309ms, SD = 752ms; AS RT M =
4321ms, SD= 769ms; and DS RTM = 4316ms, SD= 734ms).
fMRI Results
Whole-brain analysis revealed no main effect of agreement
or expertise. There was also no interaction between the two
factors. However, there was a significant association between
BOLD response and the agreement score exclusive to the
Disagree minus Agree contrast in four clusters comprising the
following network: one cluster corresponded to pMFC bilaterally,
specifically comprising dorsal medial prefrontal frontal cortex
(dMPFC), dACC, and pre-supplementarymotor area (pre-SMA);
a second cluster with peak voxel on lateral orbitofrontal cortex
(LOFC) also included AI on the right; another cluster with
peak voxel on LOFC incorporated AI and inferior frontal gyrus
(IFG); one last cluster involved the left angular gyrus (AG;
see Table 1 and Figure 2A). We averaged the percentage signal
change across all voxels of the four clusters for each participant
using MarsBaR (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net) and performed
a correlation analysis with the agreement score to better illustrate
the direction of the relationship and its strength. We found a
strong negative correlation (r = −0.68) between these variables.
The less often participants disagreed, the more activation they
showed in the network of relevant brain areas when they did
disagree (see Figure 2B).
Results from Additional Analyses
We carried out an additional analysis as a test of whether a
low proportion of disagreement truly reflects a difficulty to
disagree. First, we calculated the relative agreement RT (i.e.,
Disagree RT minus Agree RT) for each participant. We then
correlated this measure with the agreement score. We found
there was a significant negative correlation, ρ = −0.49, p =
0.001 (Spearman’s ρ is reported as normality assumptions were
violated; Pearson’s correlation, r = −0.55, was also significant at
p < 0.001).
To rule out potential confounding effects on the results,
a number of additional analyses were performed. First,
participants’ responses could have been biased by the truth-like
quality of statements (i.e., the extent to which false statements,
by virtue of being counterfeit, were intuitively perceived as less
truthful). To assess this possibility, we calculated the average
proportion of agreement with each of the four type of statements
(n/48): TP = 0.54 (SD = 0.16); FP = 0.47 (SD = 0.16); TS
= 0.52 (SD = 0.15); FS = 0.47 (SD = 0.16). The proportion
of agreement with true statements (TP, TS; M = 0.53, SD =
0.14) was statistically higher than the proportion of agreement
with false statements (FP, FS; M = 0.47, SD = 0.15), as revealed
by a paired t-test: t(38) = 4.79, p < 0.001. This indicates
that participants may have been biased by the truth-like quality
of statements. We then calculated a difference score between
the proportion of agreement with false vs. true statements and
evaluated its effect over the agreement score (with a regression
model) and the BOLD response for the Disagree minus Agree
contrast (with a whole brain voxel-wise analysis that modeled
the relationship between the BOLD response for the Disagree
minus Agree contrast, with the difference score between the
proportion of agreement with false vs. true statements). The
absence of a significant effect in both cases would be supportive
of a bias due to the truth-like quality of statements not
influencing people’s disposition to agree or the brain response to
disagreement. We found no significant effect over the agreement
score (t(38) = −0.66, p > 0.05) or the BOLD response for the
Disagree minus Agree contrast (p > 0.05, cluster corrected).
The pattern of brain activity we found could have also been
influenced by a salience effect stemming from a low proportion
of instances of disagreement for participants who disagreed less
often. To address this possibility, we estimated the proportion
of trials where participants who disagreed less often (defined
stringently as the bottom 25th percentile on the agreement
score) actually disagreed. We found these participants (n = 10)
disagreed on average 65.7 trials out of 192 (range 50–76) or 34%
of the time.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we used fMRI to ascertain why people often
have an aversion to disagree with others, and how this effect is
modulated by individual differences and other people’s expertise.
We therefore asked participants, for the first time, to make the
active decision to agree or disagree with others. We also ensured
that this decision reflected participants’ disposition to disagree
unconfounded by other factors. Results confirm our prediction
that individual differences modulate a brain network previously
TABLE 1 | Clusters exhibiting a significant association between BOLD response and the agreement score for the Disagree minus Agree contrast
(FWE-corrected).
Anatomical extent of clusters Cluster size MNI coordinates of peak voxel t-score p-value
Side x y z
pMFC bilaterally 1182 B 0 35 43 6.58 <0.001
AI/IFG/OFC 217 L −42 23 −5 4.43 0.033
AI/OFC 211 R 51 41 −8 6.01 0.035
AG 309 L −45 −64 49 4.59 0.012
pMFC, posterior medial frontal cortex; AI, anterior insula; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; AG, angular gyrus; L, left; R, right; B, bilateral.
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Map of clusters showing a significant association between the BOLD response and the agreement scores for the Disagree minus Agree contrast;
pMFC, posterior medial frontal cortex; AI, anterior insula; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; LOFC, lateral orbitofrontal cortex; AG, angular gyrus; L, left; R, right. For MNI
coordinates of peak voxels and statistics refer to Table 1. (B) Scatterplot and fitted line illustrating the negative relationship between the BOLD response (averaged
across all clusters) and agreement scores for the Disagree minus Agree contrast. Lower scores on the agreement score indicate that the participants were less likely
to disagree.
involved in disagreement and cognitive dissonance comprised
of posterior medial prefrontal cortex (pMFC) structures and AI.
Specifically, participants who disagreed less frequently exhibited
greater activation in this network when they actually disagreed.
Both pMPC and AI have been consistently found to respond
to disagreement (Klucharev et al., 2009; Berns et al., 2010;
Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010). These areas are also directly
engaged by cognitive dissonance in the context of counter-
attitudinal behavior (van Veen et al., 2009; Izuma et al., 2010).
The involvement of these brain areas in the present study
therefore suggests that actually making the decision to disagree
elicited greater cognitive dissonance in those individuals who
disagreed less often. This may explain why these individuals
found it more difficult to disagree, as they did so only
infrequently: they experienced a heightened state of mental stress
and discomfort, which they would tend to avoid. Consistent with
the interpretation that some participants found it more difficult
to disagree is the negative correlation we found between relative
agreement RT and the agreement score. This indicates that those
who disagreed less often were slower to respond when they
disagreed relative to when they agreed.
Broadly speaking, pMFC is involved in on-line monitoring
and control of action, which is especially important in situations
involving conflict between alternatives. In particular, this area
plays a key role in reinforcement learning (in both social and
non-social contexts, Ruff and Fehr, 2014), by detecting conflict
between actual and predicted states resulting in a prediction-
error signal that can be used for subsequent adjustment of
behavior (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000; Holroyd and Coles,
2002). There is evidence that aversive social experiences like
disagreement (Klucharev et al., 2009; Berns et al., 2010;
Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Izuma and Adolphs, 2013)
or agreeing with disliked people (Izuma and Adolphs, 2013)
share similar mechanisms with reinforcement learning (Izuma
and Adolphs, 2013; Izuma et al., 2015). Tellingly, transcranial
magnetic stimulation to pMFC has been found to reduce social
conformity (Klucharev et al., 2011), as well as preference change
after cognitive dissonance (Izuma et al., 2015). This suggests
the pMFC plays a causal role in behaviors that require conflict
monitoring. Not only does conflict during these circumstances
trigger a neural response in pMFC, but this signal is also
predictive of subsequent behavioral adjustments, suggesting
resolution of dissonance (Klucharev et al., 2009; Berns et al.,
2010; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Izuma and Adolphs,
2013). In the present study, the activation of pMFC in those
participants who disagreed less often is therefore consistent with
the triggering of a conflict detection signal.
As in previous studies involving disagreement (Klucharev
et al., 2009; Berns et al., 2010; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al.,
2010; Izuma and Adolphs, 2013), the pMFC activation included
also dACC and pre-SMA. Dorsal ACC is being increasingly
recognized as a node that integrates relevant information to
control action motivated by negative affect or aversive stimuli
under uncertainty, as when there is competition between
plausible alternatives (Shackman et al., 2011). Pre-SMA, in
turn, is involved in linking cognition and action, accordingly
integrating prefrontal and motor systems (Nachev et al.,
2007, 2008). Specifically, pre-SMA has been implicated in the
resolution of competition between action contingencies (Nachev
et al., 2007; Izuma andAdolphs, 2013). Dorsal ACC and pre-SMA
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involvement in the current study is therefore in agreement
with these areas playing a supporting role in the handling and
resolution of conflict.
AI is thought to be involved in cognitive dissonance by
virtue of its role in negative affect and autonomic arousal (van
Veen et al., 2009; Kitayama et al., 2013). Conflict resulting
from disagreement could therefore be expected to lead to
increased negative affect and the associated activation in AI.
However, rather than simple involvement in affect, mounting
evidence indicates that AI has an integrative function, linking
affective with interoceptive and cognitive information. As a
result, AI is thought to generate emotional awareness, a unified
meta-representation of global emotional moments available to
consciousness (for reviews see Kurth et al., 2010; Lamm and
Singer, 2010; Gu et al., 2013; see also, Craig, 2010).
A recent model postulates AI performs a more general
function as an internal hub in salience detection (Menon
and Uddin, 2010). In this model, AI mediates dynamic
interactions between large-scale networks involved in externally
and internally oriented processes leading to a heightened state of
emotional awareness with respect to a salient event. The sense
of contradiction and inconsistency that characterizes cognitive
dissonance can therefore be thought of as being intrinsically
salient and is therefore likely to be experienced as a heightened
awareness of an emotional state.
Together with pMFC and AI, a number of other areas,
including IFG and angular gyrus (AG) in the left hemisphere, as
well as lateral orbitofrontal cortex (LOFC) bilaterally, were active
in those who disagreed less often. IFG (Campbell-Meiklejohn
et al., 2010) and LOFC (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Meshi
et al., 2012) activity has previously been reported in the context of
disagreement. IFG and AG have also been implicated in cognitive
dissonance arising from counter-attitudinal conflict (van Veen
et al., 2009; Izuma et al., 2010).
More broadly, IFG and AG have been shown to play a
role in inhibition of prepotent responses (Aron et al., 2004;
Molenberghs et al., 2009; Seghier, 2013), which in the present
study may represent an inhibitory response to agreeing (the
prepotent response) when the actual response was disagreeing.
Consequently, these areas could be directly assisting pMFC’s
cognitive dissonance response arising from disagreement in
terms of response to conflict.
LOFC has an important function in the representation of
displeasure (Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004; Hayes and Northoff,
2011) and the anticipation of negative outcomes (Amodio
and Frith, 2006; Ursu et al., 2008). The involvement of
this area in the present study is therefore consistent with
the mental stress and discomfort characteristic of cognitive
dissonance potentially being experienced by those participants
who disagreed infrequently.
Previous studies have reported individual brain activity
differences in the network reported in the present study
(including pMFC, AI, IFC, LOFC), depending on how much
participants were influenced by others’ opinions (Berns et al.,
2010; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Meshi et al., 2012).
Influence was measured in terms of the magnitude of the
difference of opinion (i.e., disagreement). This further reinforces
the view that these structures form part of a network involved in a
cognitive dissonance response arising from disagreement (Berns
et al., 2010), and that they are subject to individual differences.
However, these studies have had a reactive rather than a
proactive focus: they have investigated participants’ reactions to
opinions or judgments that disagree with their own, rather than
participants’ active decision to disagree. Moreover, these previous
studies used differences in subjective preferences or valuations,
rather than difficult objective facts. The manipulations we
introduced in this study effectively allowed us to measure
participants’ disposition to disagree unconfounded by factors like
preferences, valuations, and knowledge. Our results therefore
extend previous findings by indicating that the same network of
structures is involved in disagreement whether it is reactive or
proactive.
Our agreement score can be interpreted as a measure of the
disposition to disagree (or agree), effectively a proxy for the
truth bias, and may be considered a personality trait encoded
in this network’s response. This was explicitly anticipated in the
original formulation of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957),
where personality differences were expected with respect to “fear
of dissonance” and peoples’ capacity to reduce dissonance. In
support of this view, subsequent studies have reported a number
of personality traits to be (positively or negatively) associated
with the cognitive dissonance response. These traits include
extraversion (Matz et al., 2008), preference for consistency
(Cialdini et al., 1995), self-attribution (Laird and Berglas, 1975)
as well as psychopathic personality traits (Murray et al., 2012).
Confounding factors could have potentially affected our
results. First, participant’s responses could have been biased by
the truth-like quality of the statements. While the proportion
of agreement with true statements was statistically higher than
the proportion of agreement with false statements, we found
that the difference between the proportion of agreement with
false vs. true statements had no effect on either the agreement
score or the brain response to disagreement. This indicates that
the truth-like quality of the statements had no effect on our
results. Second, rather than greater difficulty to disagree for those
who disagreed less, the pattern of brain activations we found
could reflect higher salience associated with a low proportion
of instances of disagreement for participants who disagreed less
often. Contradicting this possibility, participants who disagreed
less often still disagreed a sizeable∼35% of the time.
Conflicting with our predictions, only half of participants
agreed more often with the statements. Therefore, we found
overall no evidence of an agreement effect or truth bias (Vrij,
2000). In addition, contrary to expectation, participants did not
agree more often with people with high levels of expertise.
Consistent with these behavioral results, there was also no
significant brain activation associated with the main effects of
agreement or expertise, or their interaction. The absence of an
agreement effect, behavioral or neural, could be due to the fact
that participants may have found the experiment artificial, as
they were told that many statements were false and to actively
look out for them. Therefore, participants may have had a high
motivation to disagree. That said, the proportion of statements
agreed or disagreed with, varied widely across participants (as
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is apparent in Figure 2B). This may have canceled out the
effect of the truth bias (while at the same time accentuating
individual differences). Another explanation could be that the
experiment was low stake and, as there were no immediate or
adverse ramifications, participants may have felt there were no
impediments to disagreeing.
The failure to observe an expertise effect, on behavior or brain
activity, may be related to a potentially weak priming of the
expertise condition, with expertise priming presented only briefly
(during 5 s) at the beginning of each (65 s) block. Alternatively,
there may have been a group membership confound. In
particular, a student in-group bias may have canceled out the
effect of the high expertise group—on account of favoritism
for one’s in-group (Crocker and Luhtanen, 1990; Yamagishi
et al., 1997; Molenberghs, 2013)—as participants were mostly
university students (∼95%).
A small number of studies have investigated disagreement
behavior and its neural basis, together with how behavior and
brain responses vary across individuals and in response to social
factors (Klucharev et al., 2009; Berns et al., 2010; Campbell-
Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Meshi et al., 2012). However, this study
is the first attempting to evaluate peoples’ disposition to disagree
independent from prior knowledge, opinion, preferences or
valuations, and the effect that a social factor (expertise) may
have on this disposition. For this reason, our results are the
most direct evidence of a network responsive to disagreement
that reflects individual differences in people’s disposition to
disagree. Moreover, the structures that comprise this network
suggest cognitive dissonance is a potential mechanism explaining
why some individuals may be motivated to avoid disagreement.
Overall, the results suggest that disagreement triggers a cognitive
dissonance response where neural resources are deployed to
handle increased conflict and negative arousal, and that this
response varies across individuals.
Having a lot of trouble disagreeing due to a heightened
cognitive dissonance response may be indicative of an array
of emotional, attitudinal or social issues compromising an
individual’s capacity to make autonomous choices. This can
potentially lead to poor decision-making, anxiety, or difficulties
in interpersonal relationships. For example, introversion has
been shown to be associated with the experience of greater
dissonance discomfort (Matz et al., 2008). Moreover, evidence
indicates sensitivity to dissonance is linked to increased
susceptibility to influence (Berns et al., 2010; Campbell-
Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Meshi et al., 2012). An excessive,
pathological aversion to cognitive dissonance has even been
envisioned, where individuals would effectively exhibit an
inability to make decisions, on account of extreme avoidance
of conflicting views and change in behavior (Festinger, 1957).
Problems such as these would need to be addressed by
individuals, researchers, and health practitioners alike. The
results presented here provide a better understanding of the
neural and psychological mechanisms involved in disagreement
and can potentially be used to design better-targeted and effective
interventions in the future.
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